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1Approximate solutions for crowd-averse robust mean-field games
D. Bauso and T. Mylvaganam and A. Astolfi
Abstract—We consider a population of dynamic agents
(players). The state of each player evolves according
to a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a
Brownian motion and under the influence of a control
and an adversarial disturbance. Every player minimizes
a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on
state and control plus a cross-coupling mean-field term
measuring the congestion resulting from the collective
behavior, which motivates the term “crowd-averse”. For
this game we first illustrate the paradigm of robust
mean-field games. Second, we provide a new approximate
solution approach based on the extension of the state
space and prove the existence of equilibria and their
stability properties. Third, we provide a bound for
the approximation introduced by the solution method.
Simulations illustrating the approximate solution are
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
We illustrate the robust mean-field game approach
on a population of dynamic agents that wish to regulate
their state to zero. Each agent’s state evolves according
to a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) driven
by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a
control and an adversarial disturbance. The control
minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic
terms on state and control plus a cross-coupling mean-
field term involving the control of the single player and
the average control computed over all players. Such a
term allows the redistribution of the control load away
from peak “hours” thus reducing congestion, from
which the term “crowd-averse”. Indeed every player
pays a cost from controlling its own system when
the population as a whole has a high average control.
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Based on the provided mean-field game formulation
we analyze both the microscopic evolution of each
player and the macroscopic evolution of the system
as a whole.
Highlights of contributions. We highlight three main
contributions. First, we establish a robust mean-field
system for the considered game under adversarial
disturbances. Second, we provide a new approximate
solution approach based on the extension of the state
space in the same spirit as [14], [15]. The method
allows to prove the existence of equilibria and their
stability properties. Third, we provide a bound for the
approximation introduced by the solution method.
Related literature on mean-field games. Mean-field
games were formulated by Lasry and Lions in [10]
and independently by M.Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and R.
Malhame´ in [7], [8]. The mean-field theory of dynam-
ical games is a modeling framework at the interface
of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and
H∞-optimal control that tries to capture the mutual
influence between a crowd and its individuals. Mean-
field games arise in several application domains such
as economics, physics, biology, and network engineer-
ing (see [1], [5], [6], [8], [9], [13], [17]).
From a mathematical point of view the mean-field
approach leads to a system of two partial differential
equations (PDEs). The first PDE is the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation. The second PDE is the
Fokker-Planck equation which describes the density
of the players [10], [16]. Explicit solutions in terms
of mean-field equilibria are not common unless the
problem has a linear-quadratic structure, see [3]. In this
sense, a variety of solution schemes has been recently
proposed based on discretization and/or numerical ap-
proximations [1]. More recently, robustness and risk-
sensitivity have been brought into the picture of mean-
field games [4], [16], where the first PDE is now the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we formulate the problem. In Section III we provide
some motivations. In Section IV we derive the mean-
field game. In Section V we introduce the approximate
solution approach and study equilibria and stability
properties. In Section VI we carry out some numer-
ical studies. Finally in Section VII we provide some
conclusions.
NotationWe denote by (Ω,F ,P) a complete probabil-
2ity space. We let B be a finite-dimensional Brownian
motion defined on this probability space. Let F =
(Ft)t≥0 be its natural filtration augmented by all the
P−null sets (sets of measure-zero with respect to P).
We use ∂x and ∂
2
xx to denote the first and second
partial derivatives with respect to x, respectively.
II. PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a game with an infinite number of homo-
geneous players. For each player let x0 be its initial
state, which is realized according to the probability
distribution m0. The state of the player at time t,
denoted by xt ∈ R, evolves according to a controlled
stochastic process over a finite horizon T > 0, i.e.
dxt = [αxt + βut]dt+ σ [xtdBt + ζtdt] , (1)
where ut ∈ R is the control input, Bt ∈ R is a
Brownian motion, which is independent of the initial
state x0, and independent across players and time. The
constants α ∈ R, β ∈ R and σ ∈ R are parameters,
and ζt ∈ R is an adversarial disturbance.
To introduce a macroscopic description of the game
consider probability density functions on the state and
control spaces:{
m : R× [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, (x, t) 7→ m(x, t)∫
R
m(x, t)dx = 1 for every t,
and{
z : R× [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, (u, t) 7→ z(u, t),∫
R
z(u, t)du = 1 for every t.
Define now the average state and control distributions
at time t as 

m¯t :=
∫
R
xm(x, t)dx,
zt :=
∫
R
uz(u, t)du.
Finally we introduce a cost functional with penalty
on the final state g(·), stage cost function c(·), and
quadratic penalty on the unknown disturbance:
J(x0, u,m, ζ) = E
(
g(xT )
+
∫ T
0
c(xt, ut, z¯t)dt− γ
2
∫ T
0
|ζt|
2dt
)
.
(2)
Players wish to stabilize their state to zero, and there-
fore we can select the stage cost
c(xt, ut, z¯t, ζt) =
h
2
z¯tu
2
t +
[
a
2
x2t +
b
2
u2t
]
,
with h ≥ 0. The term h2 z¯tu
2
t represents a cross-term
coupling the control of each player and the average
control of the population; a2x
2
t , with a > 0, is the cost
of a non-zero state, and b2u
2
t , with b > 0, accounts for
a penalty on the control energy. The penalty on the
final state g(xT ) is, in general, convex with minimum
in zero, thus penalizing non-zero states at the end of
the horizon.
Note that the mean of the state is generated by
d
dt
m¯t = αm¯t + βz¯t + σζ¯t.
Considering deterministic disturbance ζt, and using
indistinguishability, we find that the mean of the
average control evolves according to:
z¯t =
1
β
(
d
dt
m¯t
)
−
α
β
(m¯t)−
σ
β
ζ¯t.
A relation between d
dt
m¯t and m¯t is yet to be intro-
duced. However, we will see later that both d
dt
m¯t and
ζ¯t can be approximated by linear functions in m¯t and
therefore we can rewrite
z¯t = kˆm¯t, (3)
for some kˆ ∈ R. The above preamble leads to the
following robust mean-field game problem.
Problem 1: (Robust mean-field problem) Let B
be a one-dimensional Brownian motion defined on
(Ω,F ,P), where F is the natural filtration generated
by B. Let x0 be independent of B and with density
m0(x). Let m
∗
t be the optimal mean-field trajectory.
The robust mean-field problem in R and (0, T ] is given
by {
inf
{ut}t
sup
{ζt}t
J(x, u,m∗, ζ)
dxt = [αxt + βut + σζt] dt + σxtdBt.
III. MOTIVATIONS
We provide three different interpretations of the
problem. The first is an example of inventory control.
The second is the description of a congestion control
problem in networked controlled systems or power
grids. Finally the third is an example from economics
and describes an oil production applications.
Example 1: (Inventory control with shared set-
up costs [13]) In multi-retailer inventory control
equation (1) describes the evolution of the inventory
over time. The control is the reordered quantity and
the disturbance is the unknown market demand. A
classical scenario is where the transportation cost is
shared among all retailers who reorder at a given
time instant, called active retailers. Then a certain
level of coordination of the retailers’ replenishment
strategies may lead to individual costs reduction. Thus
the cross mean-field term in the objective function
(2) accounts for the reduced cost when orders are
placed jointly. The other two terms are usually the
costs of reordering and shortage or the holding costs
on inventory. Clearly, we can generalize the framework
to any application where multiple players share a ser-
vice facility as airport facilities or telephone systems,
3drilling for oil, cooperative farming, and fishing (see
also the references on cost-sharing games in [13]).
Example 2: (Dynamic demand management in
power grids [2], [12]) Players are electrical appli-
ances, say for instance heating or cooling appliances,
and their state is their temperature at a given time.
Each single appliance can be in one of the two states
ON or OFF. The dynamics (1) describe the time
evolution of the temperature of each appliance. Each
single controller is given a cost function that accounts
for i) the energy consumption, which is captured by
the penalty on the control, ii) the deviation of the
mains frequency from the nominal value, represented
by the cross-term, and iii) the deviation of the agent’s
temperature from the reference value, described by the
penalty on the state. With respect to goal ii), the cross
mean-field term incentivizes the appliances to switch
OFF if the mains frequency is below the nominal value
and to switch ON if the mains frequency is above the
nominal value.
Example 3: (Oil production [4], [6]) Suppose we
have a finite number of oil producers, and let the
state be the stock of raw material available at a given
time. Let the control be the produced oil quantity by
a single producer and the adversarial disturbance be a
cautious disturbance parameter reflecting the taxation
or inflation on the produced quantity. Equation (1) is
widely used in stock market models as it describes
the variation of the reserve at time t given the current
reserve and the consumed resource quantity. The term
σtζt is intended to capture the negative and uncertain
influence of taxation, or inflation, on the production.
The cost functional, kˆm¯t is the sale’s price of oil and
the cross-term is related to the income collected from
producing and selling the quantity ut;
a
2 (xt)
2 accounts
for a production energy consumed, a > 0 and bu2t is a
known linear taxation on production. The penalty on
the final state g(xT ) can be assumed quadratic in the
reserve, so that unexploited reserve at the end of the
horizon is penalized.
IV. THE RESULTING MEAN-FIELD GAMES
Let vt(x) be the (upper) value of the robust opti-
mization problem under worst-case disturbance start-
ing at time t from state x. Let the corresponding
Hamiltonian be given by
H(x, p,m) = inf
u
{c(x, u,m) + p(αx+ βu)} ,
where p is the co-state. Then the mean-field system
associated to the robust mean-field game introduced
in Problem 1 is given by

∂tvt +H(x, ∂xvt,mt) +
(
σ
2γ
)2
(∂xvt)
2
+ 12σ
2x2∂2xxvt = 0, in R× [0, T [,
vT (x) = g(x), in R,
m0(x) = d(x) in R,
∂tmt + ∂x (mt∂pH(x, ∂xvt,m))
+ σ
2
2γ2 ∂x(mt∂xvt)−
1
2σ
2∂2xx
[
x2mt
]
= 0,
in R× [0, T [,
(4)
where d is the initial population state distribution
and g the terminal payoff. Any solution of the above
system of equations is referred to as worst-disturbance
feedback mean-field equilibrium. We are ready to
specialize the results obtained above to the case of
a crowd-averse system.
Theorem 1: The mean-field system associated to
the robust mean-field game for the crowd-averse sys-
tem is described by the equations:

∂tvt +
[
− β
2
2(b+hz¯t)
+
(
σ
2γ
)2]
(∂xvt)
2
+αxt∂xvt +
a
2x
∗2
t +
1
2σ
2x2∂2xxvt = 0,
in R× [0, T [,
vT (x) = φ|x|
2, in R,
∂tmt + ∂x
[
mt
(
αxt + β
−∂xvtβ
b+hz¯t
+ σ
2
2γ2 ∂xvt
)]
+ σ
2
2γ2 ∂x(mt∂xvt)
− 12σ
2∂2xx
[
x2mt
]
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
m0(x) = d(x) in R,
(5)
where d(x) is a given function. Furthermore, the
optimal control and worst disturbance are

u∗t =
−β
b+hz¯t
∂xvt,
ζ∗t =
σ
2γ2 ∂xvt.
(6)
Proof: We first prove condition (6). To this end
write the Hamiltonian as:
H(xt, ∂xvt,mt) = infu
{
h
2 z¯tu
2
t +
[
a
2x
2
+ b2u
2
t
]
+ ∂xvt(αxt + βu)
}
= 0.
(7)
Differentiating with respect to u gives
(b+ hz¯t)ut + ∂xvtβ = 0, (8)
which yields (6).
We now prove (5). First note that the second and
last equations are the boundary conditions and derive
straightforwardly from Bellman equations and the evo-
lution of the state.
4To prove the first equation, which is a PDE cor-
responding to the HJBI equation, replace u in the
Hamiltonian (7) by its expression (6), i.e.
H(xt, ∂xvt,mt) =
a
2
x∗
2
t +
b
2
u∗
2
t +
h
2
z¯tu
∗2
t
+∂xvtαxt + ∂xvtβu
∗
t
= −
β2
2(b+ hz¯t)
(∂xvt)
2 + αxt∂xvt +
a
2
x∗
2
t .
Using the above expression of the Hamiltonian in the
HJBI equation in (4), we obtain the HJBI in (5).
To prove the third equation, which is a PDE repre-
senting the FPK equation, we simply bring (6) into the
FPK equation in (4), and this concludes the proof.
The significance of the above result is that to find
the optimal control input we need to solve the two
coupled PDEs in (5) in v and m with given boundary
conditions (the second and last conditions). This is
usually done by iteratively solving the HJBI equation
for fixed m and by entering the optimal u obtained
from (6) in the FPK equation in (5), until a fixed point
in v and m is reached.
Note that since the Bellman equation depends ex-
plicitly on the mean of the mean-field and not on the
other moments, one can reduce the mean-field system
to a lower dimensional system. The reduced mean-
field system associated to the robust mean-field game
for the problem under study is

∂tvt +
[
− β
2
2(b+hz¯t)
+
(
σ
2γ
)2]
(∂xvt)
2
+αxt∂xvt +
a
2x
∗2
t +
1
2σ
2x2∂2xxvt = 0,
in R× [0, T [,
vT (x) = φ|x|
2, in R,
d
dt
m¯t = αm¯t + βu¯
∗
t + σζ¯
∗
t , in [0, T [,
m¯0 = d¯ > 0,
(9)
where u¯∗t = z¯t is the mean of the optimal individual
state feedback control.
V. MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY
In this section we study the problem in the extended
state space involving both the state of the player
and the average state distribution. The main idea is
illustrated in Fig. 1. In the mean-field system (9) the
gradient ∂xvt is parametrized in the average distri-
bution m¯t, which evolves according to a nonlinear
differential equation. Then, we replace the dynamics
of m¯t with two linear dynamics on the new variables
mˆt and m˜t (dashed and dotted trajectories) that upper
and lower bound the nonlinear dynamics of m¯t (solid).
−∂xvt mˆt
m¯t
m˜t
Fig. 1. Extended state space: the gradient ∂xvt depends on m¯t,
which is upper and lower bounded by mˆt (dashed) and m˜t (dotted)
respectively.
In the extended state space, the state variable evolves
according to the equations

dxt = [αxt + βut]dt+ σ [xtdBt + ζtdt] ,
d
dt
m¯t = αm¯t + βu¯
∗
t + σζ¯
∗
t ,
(10)
which can be rewritten in matrix form as[
dxt
dm¯t
]
=
(
α
[
xt
m¯t
]
+ β
[
u∗t
u¯∗t
]
+σ
[
ζ∗t
ζ¯∗t
])
dt+
[
σxtdBt
0
]
.
(11)
For this system we introduce an assumption on the rate
of convergence of the state m¯t.
Assumption 1: There exists θ such that
d
dt
m¯t = αm¯t+βu¯
∗
t +σζ¯
∗
t ≥ −θm¯t, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The above assumption implies that there exists a
variable m˜t which approximates the average distribu-
tion from below and that evolves according to{
d
dt
m˜t = −θm˜t, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
m˜0 = m¯0.
(12)
By substituting the current average distribution m¯t by
its estimate m˜t the extended state dynamics takes the
form[
dxt
dm˜t
]
=
([
α 0
0 −θ
] [
xt
m˜t
]
+
[
β
0
]
u∗t +
[
σ
0
]
ζ∗t
)
dt+
[
σxtdBt
0
]
.
(13)
Given the above dynamics we summarize the problem
5at hand as

inf
{ut}t
sup
{ζt}t
∫ T
0
[s
2
m˜tu
2
t +
q
2
m˜2t
+
(
a
2x
2
t +
b
2u
2
t − γ
2ζ2t
)]
dt[
dxt
dm˜t
]
=
([
α 0
0 −θ
] [
xt
m˜t
]
+
[
β
0
]
u∗t
+
[
σ
0
]
ζ∗t
)
dt+
[
σxtdBt
0
]
,
where s = 2hkˆ by equation (3). Reformulating the
problem in terms of the extended state
Xt =
[
xt
m˜t
]
,
yields the linear quadratic problem:

inf
{u˜t}t
sup
{ζt}t
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(XTt Q˜Xt +Ru˜
2
t − Γ)ζ
2
t
]
dt
dXt =
(
A˜Xt +Bu˜t + Cζt
)
dt+ CxtdBt,
where
Q˜ =
[
a 0
0 q
]
, R = b+ sm˜t, Γ = 2γ
2,
A˜ =
[
α 0
0 −θ
]
, B =
[
β
0
]
, C =
[
σ
0
]
.
The idea is therefore to consider a new value function
Vt(x, m˜) (in compact form Vt(X)) in the extended
state space which satisfies

∂tVt(X) +H(X, ∂XVt(X)) +
(
σ
2γ
)2
|∂xVt(X)|
2
+ 12σ
2x2∂2xxVt(X) = 0, in R
2 × [0, T [,
VT (X) = g(x) in R
2.
Assume that VT (X) is given by the quadratic form
Vt(X) = [xt m¯t]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (t)
[
xt
m¯t
]
,
where the matrix P (t) is the solution of the differential
Riccati equation
P˙ (t) + P (t)A˜+ A˜TP (t)
−2P (t)(BR−1BT − CΓ−1CT )P (t)
+Q˜/2 +W = 0,
(14)
where
BR−1BT − CΓ−1CT =
[
β2
b+sm˜ −
1
2γ2σ
2 0
0 0
]
,
W =
[
σ2P11 0
0 0
]
.
Note that in the stationary case the above differential
equation simplifies to
PA˜+ A˜TP − 2P (BR−1BT − CΓ−1CT )P
+Q˜/2 +W = 0.
(15)
Let P be the solution of the differential Riccati equa-
tion (14), then the optimal control is given by
u˜t = −2R
−1BTPXt
= − 2
b+sm¯t
[β 0]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
] [
xt
m¯t
]
= − 2
b+sm¯t
β(P11(t)xt + P12(t)m¯t),
(16)
and the worst disturbance is
w˜t = 2Γ
−1CTPXt
= 1
γ2
[σ 0]
[
P11(t) P12(t)
P21(t) P22(t)
] [
xt
m¯t
]
= 1
γ2
σ(P11(t)xt + P12(t)m¯t).
(17)
We are then in the position to establish the following
result, which provides a lower bound for the value
function in (9) when σ = 0.
Theorem 2: Let σ = 0. Then Vt(X) approximates
v(x) from below, i.e.,
Vt(X) ≤ vt(x), ∀X,x, t. (18)
Furthermore, the approximation error is upper bounded
by
vt(x)− Vt(x)
≤ s
(
2β(P11+P12)
b
)2
m¯30
[
e−3κt − e(−θ−2κ)t
]
.
(19)
Proof: The main idea is to approximate the mean
distribution m¯t from below by m˜t and from above by
mˆt. In other words we wish the following condition
to hold:
m˜t ≤ m¯t ≤ mˆt, for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (20)
The above is true if we consider the following dynam-
ics:

d
dt
m¯t =
(
α− 2β(P11+P12)
b+sm¯t
)
m¯t,
d
dt
m˜t =
(
α− 2β(P11+P12)
b
)
m¯t := −θm˜t,
d
dt
mˆt =
(
α− 2β(P11+P12)
b+smˆ0
)
mˆt := −κmˆt,
m¯0 = mˆ0 = m˜0 ,
(21)
with {
θ = −α+ 2β(P11+P12)
b
,
κ = −α+ 2β(P11+P12)
b+smˆ0
.
(22)
Then, for the approximation error we have
e(t) := vt(x)− Vt(X)
≤
∫ T
0
su˜2τ (m¯τ − m˜τ )dτ
≤
∫ T
0
su˜2τm¯0(
m¯τ
m¯0
− m˜τ
m¯0
)dτ
≤
∫ T
0
su˜2τm¯0(
mˆτ
m¯0
− m˜τ
m¯0
)dτ
(23)
6for any m¯t, m˜t, and mˆt satisfying (20). Now, from
(21)-(22), the above inequalities can be rewritten as
e(t) ≤
∫ t
0
su˜2τm¯0
[
e−κτ − e−θτ
]
dτ (24)
from which, after differentiating with respect to t and
substituting u˜t by the expression in (16), we obtain
e˙(t) ≤ s
(
2β(P11+P12)
b
m˜t
)2
m¯0
[
e−κτ − e−θτ
]
≤ s
(
2β(P11+P12)
b
)2
mˆ2t m¯0
[
e−κτ − e−θτ
]
≤ s
(
2β(P11+P12)
b
)2(
mˆt
m¯0
)2
m¯30
[
e−κτ − e−θτ
]
≤ s
(
2β(P11+P12)
b
)2
m¯30
[
e−3κt − e(−θ−2κ)t
]
which proves the claim.
A. Exponential asymptotic stability
In this section we show that the stochastic differen-
tial equation describing the closed-loop system has an
exponentially and asymptotically stable equilibrium.
To see this from (16)-(17) rewrite the dynamics for
xt in (10) as
dxt = [αxt + βu
∗
t + σζ
∗
t ] dt+ σxtdBt
=
[
αxt + (−
2β2
b+sm¯t
+ σ
2
γ2
)(P11(t)xt + P12(t)m¯t)
]
dt
+σxtdBt t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R.
and consider the following assumption.
Assumption 2: There exists κ > 0 such that
−κxt ≥
[
α+ (− 2β
2
b+sm¯t
+ σ
2
γ2
)P11(t)
]
xt
+
[
(− 2β
2
b+sm¯t
+ σ
2
γ2
)P12(t)
]
m¯t.
(25)
With the above assumption we can perform the analy-
sis within the framework of stochastic stability theory
[11]. To this end consider the infinitesimal generator
L =
1
2
σ2x2t
d2
dx2t
− κxt
d
dxt
. (26)
Then
1
2
E
(
dx2t
d2
dx2t
)
+ E
(
dxt
d
dxt
)
=
1
2
[
E
(
κ2x2tdt
2
)
+ E
(
σ2x2tdB
2
t
)
+E (−2κxtdtσxtdBt)]
d2
dx2t
+ [E (−κxtdt) + E (σxtdBt)]
d
dxt
.
Now, recalling that for a Brownian motion EdBt = 0
and EdB2t → 0, and ignoring the second-order terms
(in dt2) we obtain (26).
Consider the Lyapunov function V (x) = x2, then
the stochastic derivative of V (x) is obtained by apply-
ing the infinitesimal generator to V (x), which yields
LV (xt) = lim
dt→0
EV (xt+dt)− V (xt)
dt
= [σ2 − 2κ]x2t .
Proposition 5.1 ([11]): Let Assumption 2 hold. If
V (x) ≥ 0, V (0) = 0 and LV (x) ≤ −ηV (x) on Qǫ :=
{x : V (x) ≤ ǫ} for some η > 0 and for arbitrarily
large ǫ, then the origin is asymptotically stable “with
probability one”, and
Px0
{
sup
T≤t<+∞
x2t ≥ λ
}
≤
V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
for some ψ > 0.
From the above theorem we have the following result,
which establishes exponential stochastic stability of the
mean-field equilibrium.
Corollary 5.1: Let Assumption 2 hold. If [σ2 −
2κ] < 0 then lim
t→∞
xt = 0 almost surely and
Px0
{
sup
T≤t<+∞
x2t ≥ λ
}
≤
V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
for some ψ > 0.
B. Mean-field equilibrium
Let Assumption 2 hold. We can approximate the
mean-field equilibrium, which is captured by the evo-
lution of m¯t over the horizon (0, T ], as follows:
d
dt
m¯t ≤ −κm¯t, t ∈ (0, T ], m0 ∈ R× [0, T ],
which yields the upper bound for m¯t:
m¯t ≤ m¯0e
−κt, t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R.
Essentially, the inequality above describes converging
linear dynamics which upper bound the time evolution
of m¯t, for all t ∈ (0, T ]. As a result
d
dt
m¯t ≤
[
α+ (− 2β
2
b+sm¯t
+ σ
2
γ2
)(P11(t) + P12)
]
m¯t
t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R.
Actually, we can derive a differential equation de-
scribing the evolution of the mean distribution which
represents a bound, namely{
m¯t ≤ m¯0e
ρt
ρ = α+ (− 2β
2
b+sm¯t
+ σ
2
γ2
)(P11(t) + P12).
The equation above corresponds to saying that the
mean distribution converges exponentially to zero in
absence of the stochastic disturbances (the Brownian
motion), under the assumption that ρ is strictly nega-
tive.
7α β a b θ q γ m¯0
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Input: Set of parameters as in Table I.
Output: Distribution function mt, mean m¯t
and standard deviation std(mt).
1 : Initialize. Generate x0 given m¯0 and std(m0)
2 : for time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if t > 0, then compute mt, m¯t, and std(mt)
4 : end if
5 : for player i = 1, . . . , n do
6 : Compute control u˜ using current m¯t
7 : compute new state xt+1 by executing (1)
8 : end for
9 : end for
10 : STOP
Fig. 2. Simulation algorithm
VI. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section a system consisting of n = 103 indis-
tinguishable players, with dynamics (1), is considered.
Suppose the players seek to minimise cost functionals
of the form (2) subject to an adversary disturbance,
i.e. consider Problem 1. The optimal control and worst-
case disturbance are given by (6). However, as it is not
possible to obtain closed-form solutions for the PDEs
associated to the mean-field system, the approximate
solutions given by the control (16) and the disturbance
(17) are adopted, where the matrix
P =
[
P11(m¯) 0
0 q4θ
]
,
with P11(m¯) =
√
(σ2 + 2α)2 + 8( β
2
b+hm¯ −
σ2
2γ2 ) +
σ2 + 2α, is the positive definite solution to the al-
gebraic Riccati equation (15). The numerical results
are obtained using the algorithm in Figure VI for a
discretised set of states. The parameter σ determines
the influence of the Brownian motion, Bt, and the
disturbance ζt and simulations have been run for two
different values of σ, namely σ0 = 0, σ1 = 0.1.
The selection σ = σ0 corresponds to the case in
which there is no disturbance and the dynamics (1)
is deterministic. The simulations have also been run
for two different values of s, namely s1 = 0.5 and
s2 = 1.5 Recall that large values of s correspond to
large penalties when congestion occurs. The remainder
of the parameters are as shown in Table I.
Figure 3 shows the time histories of the states of
the players with the weights s = s1 (top row) and
s = s2 (bottom row) and the paramters σ = σ0 (left
column) and σ = σ1 (right column). Figure 4 shows
the distribution, mt, of the players states at different
times for the four different selections of parameters.
The initial and final distributions are indicated by
the dashed and solid curves, respectively, whereas the
distribution at intermediate times are denoted by the
dotted curves. Figure 5 shows the time histories of
the mean, m¯t, (left) and the standard deviation (right)
for s = s1 (top) and s = s2 (bottom). The solid
curves corrspond to σ = σ1 whereas the dashed lines
correspond to σ = σ0.
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Fig. 3. Time histories of the state of each player. Top row: s = s1,
bottom row: s = s2, left column: σ = σ0, right column: σ = σ1.
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Fig. 4. The initial (dashed line), final (solid line) and intermediate
(dotted lines) distribution, mt, of the states of the players. Top row:
s = s1, bottom row: s = s2, left column: σ = σ0, right column:
σ = σ1.
Note that in all four cases the players successfully
drive their states to zero. However, for a given value of
the parameter s,the convergence fastest in the absence
of noise and disturbances, i.e. when σ = σ0. Figure
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Fig. 5. Time histories of the mean m¯t (left) and the standard
deviation (right) of the states of the players for s = s1 (left), s = s2
(right), σ = σ0 (dashed line) and σ = σ1 (solid line).
6 shows the the time histories of the control actions
(16) of the players with s = s1 (top row) and s = s2
(bottom row), and σ = σ0 (left column) and σ = σ1
(right column). For the case in which σ = σ1, it is clear
that when s = s1 is selected the players put a larger
effort at the beginning of the simulation than when
s = s2 is selected, and the same is true for σ = σ0.
Since s2 > s1, this implies that in the former case
a larger penalty is incurred when congestion occurs
and therefore one would expect the players to stall
to avoid this, resulting in the convergence to the zero
equilibrium being somewhat slower. The simulations
are consistent with this, as for a given value of σ it
takes more time for the players to drive their states
to zero when the parameter s = s2 is selected in
place of s = s1. The simulations show that the control
actions (16) solve the robust-mean field problem for
the crowd-averse system of players.
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Fig. 6. Time histories of the control actions u˜ of the players. Top
row: s = s1, bottom row: s = s2, left column: σ = σ0, right
column: σ = σ1.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a
paradigm for crowd-averse systems. Future directions
include i) the extension of the approximation method
to more general cost functionals, ii) the study of the
case with “local” mean-field interactions rather than
“global” as in the current scenario, and iii) the analysis
of crowd-seeking scenarios in contrast to the crowd-
averse cases analyzed in this paper.
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